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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter under the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(j) and pursuant to the Order of the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah issued November 15, 2007, transferring this matter to the Utah Court of
Appeals for disposition.
Appellant, Greg Anderson ("Anderson"), a pro se litigant, has identified and
numbered numerous issues in his Brief of Appellant. Appellee, T. Richard Davis
("Davis") has addressed each of those identified issues separately in this Statement of
Issues, but will combine the treatment of related issues in the Argument section of this
Brief.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether the trial court correctly granted Davis' Motion for Summary
Judgment with its determination of the applicable statute of limitations for breach of a
written obligation and the time that the statute of limitations began to run?
Standard of Review: A trial court's summary judgment decision and its
interpretation of a statute are questions of law that this court reviews for correctness.
Barenbrugge v. State, 2007 UT App 263 f 7, 167 P.3d 549, see also Novell Inc. v.
Canopy Group, Inc.. 2004 UT App 162, *[[ 7, 92 P.3d 768. The appellate court considers
whether the trial court correctly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact exists
and whether it correctly applied the law. Id. Whether the trial court erred in applying the
six-year limitations period is a question of law. "We accord conclusions of law no
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particular deference, but review them for correctness." McKean v. McBride, 884 P.2d
1314, 1316-1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Issue 2: Whether the trial court correctly determined that the acceleration clause, if
involved by the Trustor would have had the effect argued by Anderson, notwithstanding
Anderson's failure to marshal the evidence challenging the trial court's findings regarding
the Trust Deed Note's acceleration clause and its application to the subject statute of
limitations.
Standard of Review: Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires "[a] party challenging a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding." United Park City Mines v. Stichting Mayflower
Mountain Fonds. et aL 2006 UT 35, f 24, 140 P.3d 1200 (2006). To pass this threshold,
parties protesting findings of fact must "marshal all the evidence in support of the finding
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Clark, 2005 UT 75, f 17.
Issue 3: Whether the trial court correctly determined that the acceleration clause
was not invalid by Trustor or Davis and therefore the theory of relief from the regular sixyear statute of limitations sought by Anderson was irrelevant?
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a "clearly
erroneous" standard. Young v. Young. 1999 UT 38 f 15, 979 P.2d 338; see also Nunley
v. Westates Casing Servs.. Inc.. 1999 UT 100, f 17, 989 P.2d 1077 (We give deference to
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the trial court's factual findings, however, and do not set them aside unless they are
clearly erroneous).
Issue 4: Whether the general statement of a trustee's duty as recited by Anderson
in his Brief is a cause to reverse the trial court's Order.
Standard of Review: To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must
timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis
Management. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982); James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 80102 (Utah Ct. App.1987). "Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed
waived, precluding [the appellate court] from considering their merits on appeal." Salt
Lake County v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); accord Barson v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev.
Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). Further, the mere mention of an issue in the
pleadings, when no supporting evidence or relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in
support of the claim, is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to
preserve the issue for appeal. James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App.1987).
This rule is "stringently applied when the new theory depends on controverted factual
questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial." Id. Accordingly, the
court of appeals lack jurisdiction over the appeal and "retain only the authority to dismiss
the action." Varian-Eimac. Inc. v. Lamoreaux. 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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Issue 5: Whether Anderson's statement of responsibility of a trustee to "check
applicable law of the statute of limitations prior to conduction of a trustee's sale" is (a)
correct, (b) relevant to the trial court's order of summary judgment, and (c) preserved in
the lower court's proceedings.
Standard of Review: To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must
timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an
opportunity to rule on the issuefs merits. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis
Management. Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982); James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 80102 (Utah Ct. App.1987). "Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed
waived, precluding [the appellate court] from considering their merits on appeal." Salt
Lake County v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App.1989); accord Barson v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons. Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev.
Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). Further, the mere mention of an issue in the
pleadings, when no supporting evidence or relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in
support of the claim, is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to
preserve the issue for appeal. James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App.1987).
This rule is "stringently applied when the new theory depends on controverted factual
questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial." Id. Accordingly, the
court of appeals lack jurisdiction over the appeal and "retain only the authority to dismiss
the action." Varian-Eimac. Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App.1989).
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Issue 6: Whether the trial court correctly granted Appellee's Motion for Summary
Judgment by finding that the Notice of Default filed by Appellee did not constitute a
wrongful lien?
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a "clearly
erroneous" standard. Young v. Young. 1999 UT 38 f 15, 979 P.2d 338; see also Nunlev
v. Westates Casing Servs.. Inc.. 1999 UT 100, f 17, 989 P.2d 1077 (We give deference to
the trial court's factual findings, however, and do not set them aside unless they are
clearly erroneous).
Issue 7: Whether Anderson's statement of Davis' alleged knowledge of the Utah
law of statutes of limitations is (a) correct, (b) relevant to the trial court's order of
Summary Judgment and (c) preserved in the lower court's proceedings.
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a "clearly
erroneous" standard. Young v. Young. 1999 UT 38 f 15, 979 P.2d 338; see also Nunlev
v. Westates Casing Servs.. Inc.. 1999 UT 100, f 17, 989 P.2d 1077 (We give deference to
the trial court's factual findings, however, and do not set them aside unless they are
clearly erroneous).
Issue 8: Whether the trial court erred in its declaration that Anderson's rights were
no greater than the original obligor under the Note.
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a "clearly
erroneous" standard. Young v. Young. 1999 UT 38 f 15, 979 P.2d 338; see also Nunlev
v. Westates Casing Servs.. Inc.. 1999 UT 100, f 17, 989 P.2d 1077 (We give deference to
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the trial court's factual findings, however, and do not set them aside unless they are
clearly erroneous).
Issue 9: Whether the trial court erred when it held that the statute of limitations
generally begins to run on each defaulted payment as it comes due.
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a "clearly
erroneous" standard. Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38 | 15, 979 P.2d 338; see also Nunlev
v. Westates Casing Servs.. Inc., 1999 UT 100, f 17, 989 P.2d 1077 (We give deference to
the trial court's factual findings, however, and do not set them aside unless they are
clearly erroneous).
Issue 10: Whether the trial court erred when it declared that the "Court of Appeals
has since interpreted Johnson [Johnson v. Johnson. 88 P. 230 (1906)] as adopting the rule
used in the majority of jurisdictions on governing installment contracts."
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a "clearly
erroneous" standard. Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38 f 15, 979 P.2d 338; see also Nunlev
v. Westates Casing Servs.. Inc.. 1999 UT 100,1f 17, 989 P.2d 1077 (We give deference to
the trial court's factual findings, however, and do not set them aside unless they are
clearly erroneous).
Issue 11: Whether the trial court erred when it found that "none of the cases
[Appellant] cited supports his assertion.
Standard of Review: Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires "[a] party challenging a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that
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supports the challenged finding." United Park City Mines v. Stichting Mayflower
Mountain Fonds. et aL 2006 UT 35, f 24, 140 P.3d 1200 (2006). To pass this threshold,
parties protesting findings of fact must "marshal all the evidence in support of the finding
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Clark, 2005 UT 75, ^ 17.
Issue 12: Whether the trial court erred in holding that "causes of action generally
accrue for each missed installment at the time the obligor defaults on that obligation, but
does not accrue on future installments until the obligations on those installments are
individually breached."
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a "clearly
erroneous" standard. Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38 Tf 15, 979 P.2d 338; see also Nunley
v. Westates Casing Servs.. Inc.. 1999 UT 100, If 17, 989 P.2d 1077 (We give deference to
the trial court's factual findings, however, and do not set them aside unless they are
clearly erroneous).
Issue 13: Whether the trial court erred in holding that an unexercised optional
acceleration clause does not make the accrual of a cause of action for all future scheduled
payments of an installment contract.
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a "clearly
erroneous" standard. Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38 f 15, 979 P.2d 338; see also Nunlev
v. Westates Casing Servs.. Inc.. 1999 UT 100, If 17, 989 P.2d 1077 (We give deference to
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the trial court's factual findings, however, and do not set them aside unless they are
clearly erroneous).
Issue 14: Whether the trial court erred in holding that the applicable "statute of
limitations began to run from the date that the last part of Carman, LLC's performance
was due, June 1, 2006." (R-261).
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a "clearly
erroneous" standard. Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38 Tf 15, 979 P.2d 338; see also Nunlev
v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, f 17, 989 P.2d 1077 (We give deference to
the trial court's factual findings, however, and do not set them aside unless they are
clearly erroneous).
Issue 15:Whether the trial court properly refused to order sanctions against Davis
for his conduct as Successor Trustee.
Standard of Review: To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must
timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 80102 (Utah Ct. App.1987). "Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed
waived, precluding [the appellate court] from considering their merits on appeal." Salt
Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App.1989); accord Barson v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev.
Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). Further, the mere mention of an issue in the
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pleadings, when no supporting evidence or relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in
support of the claim, is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to
preserve the issue for appeal. James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App.1987).
This rule is "stringently applied when the new theory depends on controverted factual
questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial." Id. Accordingly, the
court of appeals lack jurisdiction over the appeal and "retain only the authority to dismiss
the action." Varian-Eimac. Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App.1989).
Issue 16: Whether the trial court properly refused to impeach or strike Davis5
Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment due to a typographical
error that was found to be immaterial to the issue and corrected by a filed errata prior to
the hearing on said Motion.
Standard of Review: To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must
timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis
Management. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982); James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 80102 (Utah Ct. App.1987). "Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed
waived, precluding [the appellate court] from considering their merits on appeal." Salt
Lake County v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App.1989); accord Barson v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev.
Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). Further, the mere mention of an issue in the
pleadings, when no supporting evidence or relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in
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support of the claim, is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to
preserve the issue for appeal. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App.1987).
This rule is "stringently applied when the new theory depends on controverted factual
questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial." Id. Accordingly, the
court of appeals lack jurisdiction over the appeal and "retain only the authority to dismiss
the action." Varian-Eimac. Inc. v. Lamoreaux. 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App.1989).
Issue 17: Whether the trial court erred in denying Anderson's Motion for Summary
Judgment on his claim against Davis for constructive fraud and granting Davis' CrossMotion dismissing said claim.
Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a "clearly
erroneous" standard. Young v. Young. 1999 UT 38 f 15, 979 P.2d 338; see also Nunlev
v. Westates Casing Servs.. Inc.. 1999 UT 100, If 17, 989 P.2d 1077 (We give deference to
the trial court's factual findings, however, and do not set them aside unless they are
clearly erroneous).
Issue 18: Whether the trial Court dismissed any claim by Anderson against Davis
for breach of a fiduciary duty.
Standard of Review: To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must
timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. See Turtle Management. Inc. v. Haggis
Management. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982); James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 80102 (Utah Ct. App.1987). "Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed
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waived, precluding [the appellate court] from considering their merits on appeal." Salt
Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App.1989); accord Barson v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons. Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev.
Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). Further, the mere mention of an issue in the
pleadings, when no supporting evidence or relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in
support of the claim, is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to
preserve the issue for appeal. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App.1987).
This rule is "stringently applied when the new theory depends on controverted factual
questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial." Id. Accordingly, the
court of appeals lack jurisdiction over the appeal and "retain only the authority to dismiss
the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App.1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-12-23:

An action may be brought within six years:
(1) for the mesne profits of real property;
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an
instrument in writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-9-4:

(1)
A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as
defined in Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county
recorder against real property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual
damages proximately caused by the wrongful lien.
(2)
If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to release or
correct the wrongful lien within 20 days from the date of written request from a
record interest holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the
last-known address of the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record interest
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holder for $ 1,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for
reasonable attorney fees and costs.
(3)
A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or
for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees
and costs, who records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as
defined in Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real
property, knowing or having reason to know that the document:
(a) is a wrongful lien;
(b) is groundless; or
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves various claims by Anderson against Davis, Davis in his capacity
as Successor Trustee under a certain Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents dated May 10,
1996, related to the interest in and the conveyances of a certain parcel of real property in
Salt Lake County, Utah. 1 (R- 57-61). In 1996, Mr. Roy W. Simmons ("Simmons"), the
owner of certain real property conveyed some real property to Carman, LLC. (R- 57-61;
64-65; 68-69 and 244). In consideration therefore, Carman, LLC, through its Member
Manager, Carolyn Manning, paid $500 down and signed a Trust Deed Note for $59,500
1

Anderson has made numerous arguments, allegations and charges against Davis, Thomas B.
Price, Nathan A. Scharton, and Gary R. Howe, all lawyers with the law firm Callister Nebeker &
McCullough, as well as against that firm, and against trial court Judge Mary Kate Toomey in this
case and a more recent Complaint now filed in the U.S. District Court for the State of Utah, Civil
No. 2:07cv00673. Anderson makes several references in the record and in his Brief regarding
the above-named individuals. Davis was appointed the Successor Trustee to the Estate of Mr.
Roy Simmons and prepared all documents for the foreclosure which gives rise to this matter.
Price is one of the attorneys of record for the matter. Scharton's only involvement in the matter
was preparing a research memorandum regarding case law treatment of the statute of limitations,
in the context of an installment obligation, which memo was shared with Anderson several
weeks prior to the foreclosure sale. (R- 35). Howe received a faxed letter from Anderson,
wherein Anderson made accusations against Davis, Price and Scharton and demanded Howe act
and punish the aforementioned attorneys and stop the alleged offenses. Howe has no knowledge
or participation in the foreclosure or this appeal.

12
497991.1

and delivered to Simmons a Trust Deed, with an Assignment of Rents securing the
repayment of the Note. (R- 64-65 and 68-69). The terms of the Trust Deed Note were
regular installments, the first of one hundred and twenty monthly payments due on July 1,
1996 and a final payment, for the remaining outstanding amount, was due on June 1,
2006. The Note was not intended to fully amortize over the ten year term. On September
10, 1996, the Trust Deed was duly recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder. (R- 6465 and 68-69).
Carman, LLC, made regular payments through December 1997 and thereafter only
a few irregular installments on the Trust Deed Note (R- 68-69 and 245), the last of which
was made on July 15, 1998. After the final installment payment came due on June 1, 206,
and Carman, LLC had failed and refused to pay the balance of the Trust Deed Note,
pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Trust Deed Note, Davis was appointed as
Successor Trustee of the Roy W. Simmons Estate and began foreclosure proceedings on
the Property. (R- 75-77 and 245-246).
At some point in time, but prior to the foreclosure proceedings, Carman, LLC
conveyed the Property to E.L. Whitehead. Anderson had theretofore obtained a judgment
against E.L. Whitehead, and on January 20, 2006, proceeded to obtain a sheriffs deed to
the subject property through a sheriffs sale, subject to the duly recorded Trust Deed
which had been recorded on September 10, 1996. (R- 23 and 245).
After making the required public notices in preparation for the Trustee Sale
foreclosing on the subject property, Davis, as Successor Trustee (79 - 88 and 246), was
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contacted by Anderson and informed that Anderson claimed a superior interest in the
subject property than the Roy W. Simmons Estate and demanded that Davis cease the
foreclosure proceedings. (R- 90-91).
On March 16, 2007, Anderson filed a Complaint against Davis complaining of
actions taken by Davis in his capacity as Successor Trustee. (R- 1-8). Davis, knowing
the outstanding balance of the Note was in excess of $100,000.00, postponed the
proceedings, temporarily accommodating Anderson. The Trustee's Sale was rescheduled
and held on May 4, 2007. The Property was sold to an independent third party who has
not been made a party to this action.
The parties each filed and briefed cross-motions for summary judgment in the
litigation. Following the briefing and oral argument, the trial court denied Anderson's
Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Davis' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
(R- 244-272). In its Memorandum Decision and Order dated August 14, 2007, the trial
court essentially held that the applicable statute of limitations began on June 1, 2006 and
that Davis' actions in 2006 and 2007 to foreclose were timely. (R- 244-272). Anderson
appealed the trial court's written Memorandum Decision and Order.2 3 (R- 276-277).
2

Anderson filed a complaint with the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct
against Davis, Gary R. Howe, Nathan A. Scharton, and Thomas B. Price. See OPC File
No. 07-0615. On December 19, 2007, Margie Wakeham, Assistant Counsel, Office of
Professional Conduct, informed Appellant that the OPC, exercising its prosecutorial
discretion, would decline to prosecute any of the named attorneys and closed the case. Id.
3

Anderson has filed and served an Amended Complaint in the United States District
Court, for the District of Utah, Central Division, in the matter Anderson v. Toomey, et aL
2:07-cv-00673. Appellant has filed a civil rights suit against Judge Kate A. Toomey,
14
497991.1

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

On or about May 10, 1996, Simmons sold to Carman, LLC, certain real

property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and received in connection with said sale a
Trust Deed, with Assignments of Rents, securing a debt in the amount of $59,5000.00.
(R-57-61 and 136).
2.

On September 10, 1996, the Trust Deed was duly recorded with the Salt

Lake County Recorder, showing that it was to secure an indebtedness of the amount of
$59,500.00. The Trust Deed was recorded as Entry No. 6452338, in Book 7486 at Page
1597 of the Official Records. (R-57-61).
3.

On or about 10 May 1996, Simmons received a Trust Deed Note (the

"Note") in the original amount of $59,500, dated May 10, 1996, executed by Carman,
LLC, by Carolyn Manning, its Manager. (R-57-61 and 136).
4.

The Note was an installment obligation, the first payment of which was due

on July 1, 1996 and the final installment payment was due on June 1, 2006. During the
term of the Note, the total amount of $18,155.00 was paid toward the principal and
interest of the Note. At no time was the principal balance of the Note ever below
$49,000.00. According to the express terms of the Note, the outstanding balance was
required to be paid on June 1, 2006. (R-57-61; 136-137 and 140-141).

Davis, Gary R. Howe, Nathan A. Sharton, and Thomas B. Price. See Federal Court
Records, 2:07CV00673.
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5.

The general character of the Note was that of an installment obligation, the

first payment of which was due on July 1, 1996, and the final installment payment, for the
remaining balance owed, was due on June 1, 2006. The Note did not fully amortize under
the scheduled installment payments thereof, aside from the final "entire principal
balance" payment. The terms of the Note, in part, are as follows:
Monthly payments of $436.59 beginning on the 1st day of July 1996, and
payable on the 1st day of each month thereafter until December 31, 2006,
when a balloon payment of $4,500.00 shall be due and payable. Monthly
payments of $401.48 beginning on the 1st day of January 1997, and payable
on the 1st day of each month thereafter until June 30, 1997 when a balloon
payment of $5,000.00 shall be due and payable. Monthly payments of
$362.87 beginning on the 1st day of July 1997 and payable on the 1st day of
each month thereafter until June 1, 2006 when the entire principal
balance and accrued interest shall be due and payable.
(R-69)(emphasis added).
6.

As of November 1, 2006, the total amount due on the Note was

$104,209.63, plus collection costs. (R-137 and 141).
7.

Neither Carman, LLC, nor any other party paid off the Note. (R-137).

8.

Carman, LLC, did not assign any portion of its liability on the Note to

anyone or any entity. (R-137).
9.

On or about October 24, 2006, Davis was appointed Successor Trustee

under that certain Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents, dated May 10, 1996, to secure
certain obligations in favor of Simmons. (R-75-77).
10.

On or about November 8, 2006, Davis, in his capacity as Successor Trustee,

filed a Notice of Default, and it stated, in part, as follows:
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Notice is also hereby given that a breach of the obligations for which the
trust property was conveyed as security has occurred, in that the Note
matured on July 31, 2006, and as of November 1, 2006, principal and
interest in the amount of $104,209.63, had not been paid. (R-79-81).
11.

On or about December 29, 2006, Davis received a certain letter from

Anderson which was dated December 8, 2006, but was post marked December 28, 2006.
(R-90).
12.

Davis provided a Notice of Trustee's Sale to all interest holders, including

Anderson's owned entity, pursuant to the applicable statutes and Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Sale was scheduled to occur on March 21, 2007. (R-83-88).
13.

Davis received a second letter from Anderson dated March 20, 2007, which

asserted that the scheduled trustee sale was barred due to the statute of limitations. (R91).
14.

On January 11, 2007 and on March 20, 2007, Davis sent letters to Anderson

responding to inquiries, offering assistance, providing information, including copies of
the Note and Trust Deed, and encouraging Anderson to obtain qualified legal counsel.
(R-93-97).
15.

On or about March 16, 2007, Anderson filed a Complaint initiating this

action and recorded a Lis Pendens with the Salt Lake County Recorder. (R-99).
16.

On or about May 4, 2007, Davis caused that a Trustee Sale of the subject

property was conducted at the time and place designated.

17
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17.

Following the filing of cross-motions for Summary Judgment, on or about

July 13, 2007, a hearing was held before Judge Kate Toomey for oral argument of said
motions. (R-212-214 and 244).
18.

On August 14, 2007, Judge Kate Toomey entered her Memorandum

Decision and Order denying Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting
Davis' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R-244-272).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Davis' summary of his argument begins and ends with the terms and conditions of
the Trust Deed Note given to Mr. Roy Simmons by Carman, LLC. Importantly, one of
the main terms of the Trust Deed Note was that it was an installment contract. During the
ten-year term of the Trust Deed Note, Carman, LLC missed many installment payments.
After each missed payment Mr. Simmons could have invoked the optional acceleration
clause included in the terms of the Trust Deed Note, but he did not.
The express terms and conditions of the Trust Deed Note provide for one-hundred
and twenty consecutive payments, and that Carman, LLC had continuing obligations to
pay "until June 1, 2006 when the entire principal balance and accrued interest shall be due
and payable." (R-69). The installment character of the Note together with a balloon
remainder payment provide the basis for Davis' argument and the trial court's Order
denying Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting Davis' Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment. The payment terms provide the exact date in which the statute of
limitations began to run on Carman, LLC's breach of the installment contract for non-
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payment. As long as Mr. Simmons did not invoke the optional acceleration clause,
Carman, LLC could theoretically miss all installment payments and still pay the balance
of the I rust D^cd A\^u, by , ...^ . ...•;..;, m the last installment payment which was to
]

jju-lu.1

'

•

. , ] - . - .

- . 1 -

after the final installment payment was due and the statute of limitations had begun,
Davis, for the benefit of Simmons, began foreclosure proceedings on the subject property
and compicicu uie bai
within the statute of limitations to foreclose on the Trust Deed Note.
Moreover, Anderson claims that Davis failed and refused to meet his duties and
obligations as successor trustee to the Simmons relative to Anderson. First, the successor
trustee M""*c "•

inmM •* * l

-n^Hr* *

neither. At best, Anderson's interest in the property is that of an owner, subsequent to the
grantor, who took ownership subject to the actual notice of the Trust Deed lien, duly

make a claim disputing the nature or priority of his interest in the property, subject to the
Trust Deed lien. Anderson only argues that the successor trustee is time-barred from
foreclosing on the property due to the statute of limitations which Anderson asserts (1)

triggered the invocation of the optional acceleration clause of all the remaining future
installments payments.

iy
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE APPLICABLE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE TRUST DEED NOTE IS SIX
YEARS AND THAT IT BEGAN ACCRUING ON JUNE h 2006,
The trial court, Anderson and Davis are all in agreement that the applicable statute

of limitations in this matter is six years as outlined in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-23. (R247). An action based upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an
instrument in writing must be brought within six years from the date of occurrence. See
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-12-23. The Utah Supreme Court has stated the test for

determining if a written instrument falls within the six-year statute of limitations is, "if
the fact of liability arises, is assumed, or imposed from the instrument itself, or its recitals,
the liability is founded upon the instrument in writing." Empire Land Title, Inc. v.
Weyerhaeuser Mortg. Co.. 797 P.2d 467, 469 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Brigham
Young Univ. v. Paulsen Const. 744 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Utah 1987) (quoting Bracklein v.
Realty Insurance Co.. 95 Utah 490, 500, 80 P.2d 471, 476 (1938)). Neither the parties nor
the trial court dispute that the Trust Deed Note is a contract and that the subject liability
of the purchaser is founded upon the writing and the six-year statute of limitation is
applicable. Moreover, neither the parties nor the trial court disagree that the six-year
statute of limitation begins to run at the moment that a cause of action arises.
The basis of the controversy and the appeal at bar is Anderson's disagreement with
Davis5 argument and the trial court's determination of when the six-year statute of
limitations began on the subject Trust Deed Note. Anderson asserts that the six-year
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I C missed its first installment

payment, in 1998. (R-248). Davis argued and the trial court determined that the six-year
statute of limitations did not begin at the earliest, until each installment was missed and
oiiiiil',
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remaining balance was due. (R-261). The trial court found that the Trust Deed Note was
an installment-type contract. (R-245). The Utah Supreme Court addressed when the
statute Oi limitations begins relative to an installment-type contract.
when contract obligations arc payable b> installmrn" *w statu; of
limitations begins to run onl> w ith respect to each ni^Munieni v\ hen u
becomes due. . . . the contract is a continuing one during the life of the
plaintiff, but maturing in installments of yearly payments.
may be
enforced by proper action whenever and as often as an installment falls due
and remains unpaid.
Nilson-Newey & Company vr. Utah Resources Internationa;.

*v

'^

'

*

Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 88 P. 230, 232 (Utah 1906). See Bracklein
v. Realty Ins. Co et al v. Realty Ins. Co.. 80 P.2d 471, 478 (Utah 1938) (the liability of a
purchaser of mortgaged premises, who assumes and agrees to pay UK ih jngagc ucut,
accrues as to start the statute of limitations running, when the note becomes due.); Moab
National Bank v. Keystone-Wallace Resources. 517 P.2d 1020 (1973) (holding that a
statute of limitations begins itinning upon the failure to pay each msiah..ient.).
h n p n i l mil! i l i m v r v i ' i
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i n s t a l l m e n t p n y m n i l in

the Trust Deed Note. (R-69). Carman, LLC and Mr. Simmons a g r c ^ w*Aat the final
installment payment by Carman, LLC would include "the entire principal balance and

21
497991.1

accrued interest shall be due and payable." (R-69)4. The Trust Deed Note's June 1, 2006
installment payment (1) was the last installment of the contract and (2) the last
opportunity for Carman, LLC, to pay the remaining balance pursuant to the terms of the
Trust Deed Note, so the accrual of the statute of limitations began on June 1, 2006.
Based upon Vreede v. Koch. 380 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. CT. App. 1989) the trial court
correctly held that the six-year statute of limitations began to run, June 1, 2006, the date
the last installment payment was due pursuant to the terms of the Trust Deed Note. The
trial court held, "when the terms of a note require a debtor to tender the balance of the
unpaid principal and interest on a specific date, the statute [of limitations] run from that
date." (R-265). The facts in Vreede are similar to the facts of the appeal at bar. Both
matters focus on payment pursuant to an installment contract, which included an
acceleration clause at the creditor's option. Both installment contracts concluded with an
installment payment at the end of the loan term, which provided for any unpaid balance,
including interest. Vreed at 616-617. The Vreede court held that the creditor did not
invoke the acceleration clause prior to the last installment payment and that the accrual of

4

The terms of the Note, in part are as follows:
Monthly payments of $436.59 beginning on the 1st day of July 1996, and payable on the
1st day of each month thereafter until December 31, 2006, when a balloon payment of
$4,500.00 shall be due and payable. Monthly payments of $401.48 beginning on the 1st
day of January 1997, and payable on the 1st day of each month thereafter until June 30,
1997 when a balloon payment of $5,000.00 shall be due and payable. Monthly payments
of $362.87 beginning on the 1st day of July 1997 and payable on the 1st day of each
month thereafter until June 1, 2006 when the entire principal balance and accrued
interest shall be due and payable. (R-69)(emphasis added).
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unpaid balance, interest shall be due. Vreed, at 618.
In the present case, Judge Toomey determined that neither Mr. Simmons nor Davis

court held, "[cjreditors should not be penalized for allowing debtors the opportuni' to
meet their obligations by an agreed date. In this case, the Note allowed Carman, LLC to
tender complete performance on the Note by June 1, 2006. Mr. Simmons's forbearance

LLC defaulted on its installments." (R-260-261).
Anderson argues that the acceleration clause automatically was invoked when
Cuima.

.

.nsianmentpaymen

misquotes Cooper v. Deseret Federal Savings ana ^oa,., *

i

.
^4^

. uiaerson
• *

1988) to try to establish that if a creditor is going to invoke the accelerator clause in a
loan document, "the obligee has a reasonable time after the default or the event which

at 485. See Appellant's Brief, p. 32. Anderson's reliance upon Cooper is misplaced.
Nowhere in Cooper does the court hold that an optional acceleration clause is
.i ;i:-< . - M u l l ! } • * ; ; . :

declare that the obligee had

-
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"reasonable time" to fleet to .-, - v Vmi'
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Cooper court specifically held that defendant Deseret's wait of more than four years a_«
it learned of the sale of the subject property, the only act which would allow Deseret to
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invoke the due on sale clause, was beyond a reasonable time. Cooper at 486. The Cooper
court, while determining that Deseret was time-barred from exercising the due-on-sale
clause, cautioned, "[o]f course, each case must be considered on its own facts,..." See
Cooper at 485.
This case is clearly distinguishable from Cooper. Carman, LLC missed some
installation payments. After each missed installment, Mr. Simmons could have exercised
the optional acceleration clause, but elected not to. He did not ever make that election.
The final installment payment, the installment which the parties bargained would allow
Carman, LLC to pay the balance of principal and interest, occurred on June 1, 2006.
Cooper waived his right for waiting in excess of four years after the triggering action and
then attempted to make that election. Simmons, unlike Deseret, did not sit on his rights
after the triggering event and then attempt to utilize that right. Davis waited only six
months after the June 1, 2006 to exercise his rights through foreclosure without resorting
to an acceleration clause. The explicit identification of the June 1, 2006 as the last
installment payment for the balance owed also distinguishes this matter from Cooper.
The specific time requirement lacking in Cooper, which necessitated the court to
determined what was reasonable, is not applicable with the Simmons Trust Deed Note.
The date certain of the final installment payment establishes to all when the statute of
limitations began to accrue and when Simmons or Davis needed to have act to preserve
Simmons' rights.
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Anderson cites to Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corporation,

•

p

1983) throughout his Brief to support his arguments regarding the applicable statute of
limitations and how the statute of limitations work with an acceleration clause in the

his repeated identification of Davis as counsel for the iin ;u:

;fnl

• <-]i

in Fredericksen. Anderson claims that, as counsel in Fredericksen, Davis has a higher
duty and understanding as to his duties as Successor Trustee in the present matter. Id.
.A nderson's reliance i lpon Fredericksen v. Kmght Land Corporation.
1983) is incorrect. Fredericksen is also clearly distinguished from the matter at bar. In
Fredericksen, the issue was "whether a cause of action accrued against Knight six years
^uii^K..,

i commencement" of an action. Fredericksen at S(>. .'he

contract between Fredericksen, and Km'^ht was h n ^ i

'.

t * •», »..v ,<

property in excess of $85.00 per acre in gross profits. Id. The Fredericksen court held
that the determining contractual factors had occurred "during the period from 1963
redericksen .,il "'• , hrdericksen diguol lh.il nnlw illisLmding the long
past sales of acres, the contract impliedly allowed him to make a formal demand to
exercise the option for the conveyance of land instead of payment of money, and did not
se t a schedi lie • foi making bi.... ,i ueniand. Fredericksen had not made such a demand
until many years following the sales,

!

" r>*\Wi. y - - n ^ .no
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Where a demand is necessary to start a limitation period running, a party is
not permitted to postpone indefinitely or unreasonably, by failing to make
demand, the time when the statute will begin to run, for by his laches he
may be deemed to have perfected his right of action so as to start the
running of the statue although he never actually made demand.
Fredericksen, at 38. The Fredericksen court identified Fredericksen's unreasonable and
unjustifiable inaction that prejudiced the other party as a latches issue and would not
reward Fredericksen's inactivity. Simmons' decision not to invoke the optional
acceleration clause during the period of the loan was reasonable and justifiable and not
beyond the statutory period covering the specifically scheduled payments. Simmons
could wait until the last installment and allow Carman, LLC every opportunity to meet its
obligations to pay the balance of the loan, principal, interest and costs.
Fredricksen and the present case are both based upon a contract with periodic
payments, and both trial courts held that the applicable statute of limitations began when
the cause of action arose. However, in Fredericksen the court determined the cause of
action arose between 1963 andl968 when the terms of the contract were met and based
upon the legal theory of laches, Fredericksen's unreasonable inaction prohibited him from
exercising the option. Fredericksen at 37. The case at bar is different in that (1) the Trust
Deed Note listed the specific monthly installments at amounts-certain and (2) the Note
was for a limited and specified time. These two facts demonstrate that the option to
accelerate the Trust Deed Note or begin foreclosure proceedings did not accrue until
June 1,2006.
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Additionally, Anderson states, "[w]hen the statute of limitations has ic

-

•

longer has any claim to the property." See Appellant's Brief, p. 37. Anderson's statement
is not the law. Statute of limitations have nothing to do wim uic interest in the property

by the encumbering trust deed. The statute of limitation is not an absolute bar, but a
conditional bar. The obligor could still make a payment or reaffirm the promise of
i i> iM-

oi limitation lor that obligation would start
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over. Anderson offers no k .\\ >\
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The trial court was correct to determine that the applicable statute of limitations
was six years, that the statute of limitations began on June 1, 2006 and that the
- <*•*l*• *
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Anderson's appeal and affirm the trial court's ruling.
TT

THE ACCELERATION CLAUSE IN THE TRUST DEED NOTE WAS NOT
INVOKED AUTOMATICALLY OR FORMALLY BY EITHER SIMMONS
NOR HIS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE.
In asserting his argument repn*-'

f

^

- f) °
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statute of limitations and how the Trust Deed Note's acceleration clause5 would not toll or
stop the 1998 accrual of the applicable statute of limitations, Anderson argues,

It default occurs in ilii
ncnt of said
ot piiiioipai
part thereof, or in the perfoiinjnce of any ag
lined in the
this note, the holder hereof, at its option and ^miuui m . e or deman
entire principal balance and accrued interest due and pa) dbL. (R-68>
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[a]n acceleration clause in a written contract, at best would add one month
to the six year statute of limitations in a written contract that has on optional
acceleration clause. . . . [ijf under Utah Law, an optional acceleration clause
gives a beneficiary of a trust deed additional time beyond the six year
period for contracts in writing, that additional time would not apply to 3rd
parties who have not formally assumed the liabilities of the trust deed note."
Appellant's Brief, p. 33.
Anderson's argument regarding the acceleration clause is confusing and incorrect.
Neither Davis argued nor the trial court held that the acceleration clause was invoked, nor
that the clause, if invoked, would have extended the statute of limitations until
November 1, 2006 or later. (R-245 and 255-258). The trial court was persuaded by the
holding in Navy Federal Credit Union v. Jones, 930 P.2d 1007 (Ariz. CT. App. 1996),
declaring,
[tjhis court is persuaded by the rule applied in Navy Federal Credit Union,
and applies it to this case. One missed installment in the presence of an
optional acceleration clause does not automatically start the statute of
limitations for the remaining installments. The statute begins to run on
future installments only if the creditor exercises the option.
(R-258). Simmons' and his Successor Trustee had the choice whether to invoke the
acceleration clause whenever Carman, LLC, missed an installment payment, or to wait
and allow Carman, LLC to pay the balance with the last installment payment according to
the explicit terms of the Trust Deed Note. It was only after Carman, LLC missed the final
installment payment that the Davis decided to act upon the legal rights of foreclosure
afforded to Simmons as holder of the Trust Deed Note. Moreover, the trial court also
addressed Anderson's argument that the contractual right to invoke the acceleration
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clause and demand the remainder of the installments is equivalent to an accn led can ise of
action. (R-255-258). The trial court's analysis of Navy Federal Credit Union v. Jones,
9JU . . v; J Ww ^. w „ * ,

r.

J 9%) addressed and refuted Anderson's argument.

the majority rule a w ,* the ci e iltoi opt s to in \ ol ce the aceeleu*
,
c
then the statute of limitations imis as to future installments lroi. ...
J
the creditor exercises the acceleration clause.' The court explained that 'if
the acceleration clause in a debt payable in installments is optional, a cause
of action as to future non-delinquent installments does not accrue until the
creditor chooses to take advantage of the clause and accelerate the balance.
(T?-'>^iimt..
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. Nav y Federal Credit

Union is directly on point. Simmons and Davis did not exercise the optional acceleration
clause during the period of the Trust Deed Note. Therefore the cause of action and
reiaicuu, uic sum ... ... . statute 01 limitations, for the missed final installment payment
did not accrue
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•6. Therefore, based upon the trial court's determination that the applicable statute of
I
limitations began to accrue on June 1, 2006, without any consideration of the acceleration
<
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III.
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ANDERSON'S ASSERTIONS REGARDING A TRUSTEE'S DUTIES WAS
NEITHER INCLUDED IN ANDERSON'S COMPLAINT NOR IN
ANDERSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
"!"1" ndei son discusser . - asserts certain dunes m^ u„ v .^ should perform due to his

role as Successor Trustee. Sec Appellant's Brief, pp. 14-T7 I) », i\ ;is Successor 1 nislrr,
have specific duties to specific groups of individuals, the trust beneficiaries and the
trustor. See In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53 f 30? 144 P.3d 1129, It is well settled
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that [a] trust is a form of ownership in which the legal title to property is vested in a
trustee, who has equitable duties to hold and manage it for the benefit of the beneficiaries.
Anderson asserts that Davis owed some type of fiduciary duty to Anderson. See
Appellant's Brief, pp. 34-37. Yet, Anderson fails to provide any case law supporting his
assertion. Anderson is only a successor in interest to the trustor. As such, he has rights to
the subject property, albeit limited. He does not, however, qualify as a beneficiary or
even the trustor relative to a fiduciary duty from Davis as successor trustee.
However, despite the lack of a fiduciary relationship with Anderson, Davis at all
times fulfilled his duties and demonstrated professionalism in his conduct with Anderson.
Despite Anderson's aggressive, demeaning, and unprofessional attacks on Davis, Davis
attempted to assist Anderson to understand what was occurring with the subject property
and avoid a costly trial and appeal. In response to Anderson's letter, dated December 8,
20066, Davis responded in writing attempted to explain the facts of the matter, strongly
encouraged Anderson to obtain qualified legal counsel and offered to discuss the matter
further. (R-93-94). Davis, in response to Anderson's letter dated March 20, 20077,
forwarded a research memorandum authored by Nathan Scharton, a lawyer of the law
firm Callister Nebeker & McCullough. (R-35). The short memorandum provides a
general and correct explanation to the issue of the case at bar. Despite the lack of a

6

(R-90).

7

(R-34)
30
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fiduciary relationship, Davis accommodated Anderson regarding time and encouraged
Anderson to seek competent legal counsel regarding this matter.
1 'he trial court held that the case Anderson cites, Blodgett v. Martschu 590 P.2d

beneficiary. (R-262). The trial court further held that Davis, the Successor Trustee,
"owes a fiduciary duty to the Roy Simmons estate (the successor to the beneficiary) and
Carii: {•

jspuc w iiui iiiw iriai wourt stated, Anderson still asserts that

Davis owed Anderson a "special duty" and that Dai; is \* as "a prime exai nple of a ti i istee
who is unprotective of borrowers. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 34-35. However, a trustee's
duties and obligations have been outlined by this Court.
A trustee's primary obligation is to assure u

i -i mi- uci

*•_ u cd

by the trust deed. See Five F, L.L.C. v. Heritage aav. Bank, 2003 U1 App
373,^[ 13-15, 81 P.3d 105. In certain circumstances, however "it is possible
that the trustee is bound by a fiduciary duty to act in the interest of the
trustor." First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d
1253, 1256 (Utah 1 9 8 9 ) . . . .
While a trustee's primary duty and obligation is to the beneficiary of the
ti ust, "'the trustee's duty to the beneficiary does not imply that the trustee
may ignore the trustor's rights and interests.' " Five F. L.L.C, 2003 UT App
at f 17 (quoting Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d at 1256). Rather, a trustee has
a duty " 'to act with reasonable diligence and good faith on [the trustor's]
behalf consistent with [the trustee's] primary obligation to assure payment
of the secured debt.'" Id at f 14 (alterations in original) (quoting Blodgett,
590 P.2d at 303).

8

In Appellant's Brief, p. 34 and (R-27).
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Russell v. Lundberg. 2005 UT App 315ffif19 and 22, 120 P.3d 541. It would be
inappropriate and a likely conflict of interest if Davis treated Anderson as Anderson
demands. Davis' duty was to the beneficiaries and the Estate of Roy Simmons. It is clear
that the interest of the beneficiaries and the estate of Roy Simmons are in conflict with the
interest of Anderson. Davis did precisely what he was supposed to do. Moreover,
Anderson has not supported one of his allegations of Davis' failing to perform in
maintaining his fiduciary duties.
Anderson did not plead a breach of fiduciary or any other duty by Davis. (R-l-8).
Anderson did complain of "constructive fraud" based in part upon Davis' alleged duties
to Anderson (R-5-6). In Anderson's Memorandum in Support of his Motion for
Summary Judgment, Anderson asserted that Davis had a duty not only to the beneficiary
buts also to the trustor, implying that Anderson was a trustor. (R-27). However, the trial
court held, Davis "does not owe a fiduciary duty to an interest-holder in secured
collateral. Successor Trustee holds no confidential relationship with [Anderson]. (R268). Due to the lack of a confidential relationship between Anderson and Davis,
Anderson cannot establish and has not established any element in the cause of action of
constructive fraud.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE NOTICE OF
DEFAULT FILED BY DAVIS DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WRONGFUL
LIEN.
Anderson alleged that the Notice of Default, recorded by Davis, on the subject

property on December 29, 2006, constituted a wrongful lien pursuant to Utah's Wrongful
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Lien Act. (R-3-4 and Appe11 -nt's Rrirf r

^i'1"^

of Default is wrongful because the Trust Deed Note "has been paid, and/or the statute of
I
limitations has run." Id. However, the Notice of Default is not a lien, it does nothing
more than declai e that a defai ill: exists n i the i epayment obligation secured by a properly
filed Trust Deed Note. The Notice of Default is not a wronr*ii!
statute.9
Anderson cites to Commercial Inv. Corp v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) and ntt

he Commercial Investors 1 \

rt-

M. ^L-L-

Appellant's Brief, p. 38-39. In Commercial Investors, the court was considering a Notice
I
of Interest that should have covered a smaller portion of the subject property than it
li u

.. _

.. misunderstands those facts and derives from that case the notion that the

Notice of Default (not Notir i oflntrrro

. <*i «i

-

^ lt.*e

encumbrance on the subject real property unauthorized by law. However, the trial court
i

held that because Simmons retained "a valid security interest in the real property at issue,
1

' »»«"':

ea<. <et!

., .n

*er.. •; J. ^

\ was authorized

to file the Notice [of Default] under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23 (2006). (R-26n

9

FhvU

A wrongful lien is defined in section 38-9-1(6):
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create t
... • :; i
interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded oi n, , ^ not.
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute;
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in the
state; or
!
(c) signed by or authorized pun> 'Hi •
CUM,. :\ cii> .,,,,,,, .
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1(6).
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fulfilled his duty to provide notice of the debtor's default and the upcoming sale of the
Property as prescribed in UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-26 et seq. The Notice of Default only
provides notice that the Trust Deed Note, secured by a previously filed trust deed, is in a
condition of default. A Notice of Interest, as considered in Commercial Investors gives
notice of a new interest in the property. A Notice of Default and a Notice of Interest are
very different.
Neither the Trust Deed nor the Notice of Default constitute a wrongful lien under
Utah's Wrongful Lien Act nor wrongfully cloud the title in any way. Importantly,
Anderson purchased the Property subject to Simmons' duly executed, acknowledged,
certified and recorded lien. See UTAH CODE ANN. §57-3-102. The Trust Deed was
recorded on September 10, 1996, several years prior to Anderson's purchase of the
property and enjoyed superior priority to Anderson's claims to the subject property. See
Homeside Lending v. Miller, 2001 UT App 247, ^ 17, 31 P.3d 607 (normally, competing
interests in land have priority in order of their creation in point of time, following the
general rule .. . first in time, superior in right). There is no dispute that the Trust Deed's
lien was duly recorded pursuant to the requirements outlined in Utah statutes. There is no
dispute that the Trust Deed's lien has priority to Anderson's purchase. Moreover,
reasonable minds cannot differ that there was still an outstanding balance on the Trust
Deed Note. (R-137 and 141) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-40.
Anderson's claim that the statute of limitations makes the Notice of Default a
wrongful lien is erroneous. As presented above, Davis and Simmons acted well within
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the applicable statute of limitations and could lawfully pursue the foreclosure pror-vdinr
The trial court correctly held that the Notice of Default was '"expressly authorized' by the
Utah Code, and does not fall within the definition of a wrongful iicn. I iah Code Ann. §
i^j)

i.

''

THE COURT CORRECTLY DENIED ANDERSON'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THAT ANDERSON FAILED TO ESTABLISH
THE ELEMENTS OF CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD.
To establish his claim : f consti ucti \ e fraud against Davis, Anderson was required

to establish, "two elements: (i) a confidential relationship betvw - "'

.»»1 i<^• .\• -.•'!

failure to disclose material facts. d'Elia v. Rice Development, Inc. 2006 UT App 416, ^[
- ..^ . ..- (citing Jensen v. 1HC Hospitals. 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997)).

Anderson and Davis do not share a confidential relationship, nor had Davis failed to
disclose any material facts to Anderson. Additionally, the only entity to gain from the
foi eclosi n e of the property were the beneficianes. As stated above, Davis' basic duty was
to the beneficiaries of the tr * Iced andn :»t t : • a si i : :: :: ssc i in int n : st t : the • : \ ' • ne it: : f the
property.
Anderson asserted that Davis owed him certain duties similar in that from a trustee
1 , 1

iC L;L111V.'

I' ]

" * \

Mill

either a confidential relationship with Davis or that Davis has failed to provide any
information or facts, material or other. (R-148 and 262-263). ,

Icrson cites to First

Security rmnK ot UtahN.A. v. tsanberry Crossing, /Mi i'.2d i -.'.. • * «, .= ^89) and
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Blodgett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978) quoting that "a trust deed trustee may
not. . . defraud a trustor." See Appellant's Brief, p. 47. Anderson fails to establish that
he is a trustor, relative to the subject property that Davis is the trust deed successor
trustee. Additionally, Anderson states, "[t]he fact of the matter is that defendant T.
Richard Davis just claimed to be a trustee, but in reality was not because the statute of
limitations ran." See Appellant's Brief, p. 47-48. Not only does Anderson fail to establish
the necessary relationship, but in places within his brief, even denies that Davis is a
trustee.
Davis, in his role as Successor Trustee, has complied with all duties that he may
have had with Anderson in that "he has honored that duty by complying with the notice
statutes governing trustee sales." (R-263). Moreover, Davis offered to meet with
Anderson and his counsel to discuss the foreclosure proceedings. (R-94). Davis offered
to attend an emergency hearing with the court, if Anderson requested such a hearing, to
resolve Anderson's concerns. (R-95). Davis forwarded a copy of the Note and Trust
Deed to Anderson for his review. Davis encourage Anderson to seek qualified counsel.
Davis had no further duty to Anderson.
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VI.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADDRESS ISSUES OF SANCTIONS
AGAINST DAVIS AND IMPEACHMENT
Anderson includes arguments for sanctions10 against Davis and impeachment11 of

Davis' memoranda filed with the trial court covering the Cross-Summary Judgment
Motions. However, neither issue of sanctions nor the issues of impeachment was
included in Anderson's Complaint or Memorandum in Support of his Motion for
Summary Judgment, neither were they ruled on by the trial court.
This Court does not have the jurisdiction to decide issues raised for the first time
on appeal. Anderson now attempts to raise these issues for the first time on appeal. The
trial court did not make any determination as to the issues of sanctions and impeachment.
Therefore, Anderson is barred from raising these issue on appeal because it was neither
argued nor determined below. See State v. Richins. 2004 UT App 36, | 8, 86 P.3d 759
("In order to preserve an issue for appeal, i t . . . must be specifically raised such that the
issue is sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court, and must be
supported by evidence or relevant legal authority."); Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ^f
39, 86 P.3d 699 (The court "will review issues raised for the first time on appeal only if
exceptional circumstances or "plain error" exists."). See Heideman v. Washington City,
2007 UT App 11,115, 155 P.3d 900.

10

See Appellant's Brief, pp. 43-47 and (R-223-243).

11

See Appellant's Brief, p. 47 and (R-199-211).
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Moreover, addressing Anderson's concern regarding his allegations of impropriety
and misquotes. Davis filed an Errata with the trial court, correcting the typographical
error in the pleading. However, if typographical errors constituted constructive fraud or
fraud upon the court, most memoranda, including Anderson's Brief, which contains
numerous typos, would fall into the same category and result in unnecessary accusations
and disaster.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, based upon the above-stated argument, Davis respectfully requests this
Court to affirm the trial court's granting of Davis' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
and denial of Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this H day of January, 2008.
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH

T. Richard Davis, Esq.
Thomas B. Price, Esq
Attorneys for Appellee
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